Counteracting systemic risk caused by reactive cooperative behavior by Boza, G. et al.
Cooperative investment, an act that benefits others at own costs, is always at risk of being 
exploited by selfish behavior. We study continuous cooperative investments of individuals 
with reactive investment strategies, where investments depend on the actual partner’s 
investment behavior, which is expected to provide a safeguard against exploitation. We show 
that the coevolution of such strategies can, however, induce systemic risk to the population as 
the spread of exuberant investors induces investment cycles with phases of low initial 
investment → defensive, cautious conditional investors → exuberant investors → exploiters 
→ and non-investors. There are several ways to counteract these boom-bust cycles. 
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When individuals or agents make investments, countermeasures against exploitation or cheating are crucial for success. In our model of 
reciprocal investment game, strategy evolution typically leads to exuberant investment cycles. Here, what seems to be rational at the 
individual level, paves the way for systemic level risk. However, when reactivity – diversity – modularity are employed, individually or 
combined, stable investment levels can replace systemic level boom-bust cycles and can stabilize cooperative investment behavior.  
Third, to model social interaction structure, we assume that cooperating individuals or 
agents form small communities, and that transfer of knowledge between these 
communities appears only at a limited rate β, so that 
► when β is small, the population behaves as a well-mixed community, i.e. every 
agent can learn from any other agent from the whole population.  
► On the other hand, when β approaches 1, the population reaches a modular 
structure, and information transfer is restricted only to the local community. 
 
By decoupling investment behaviors between the local investor communities and 
setting back the spread of exuberant and exploiter strategies, optimal level of 
modularity can stabilize cooperative behavior at the systemic level. 
